IRAN, THE GCC, AND BAHRAIN: THE LINE IN THE SAND

Number 45 ● 20 May 2011

 At the conclusion of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) Consultative Summit, on 10 May 2011, the Sunni monarchies of the Persian Gulf repeated their unusually critical 4 April statement which expressed serious concern regarding "the continuing Iranian intervention in the internal matters of GCC countries by conspiring against their national security" (KUNA, 10 May 2011).

Iran and the Arab Gulf states have drawn a proverbial line in the sand, and it lies across the archipelago of 33 islands that constitute the Kingdom of Bahrain. The popular revolt against Al Khalifa rule in Bahrain has exposed the socio-political chasm between the Sunni Arab monarchies that rule on the Arab littoral and Shi'i Iran. Sunni-Shi'i tension, perhaps even confrontation, in the region is at its peak since the US invasion of Saddam's Sunni dominated Iraq in 2003.  Indeed, the rhetoric has reached such a fevered pitch that Kuwaiti political scientist, Abdullah Al Shayji, said the atmosphere between Iran and the GCC is a "Cold War" pushing the region "toward the abyss," (Gulf News, 4 April 2011) while Iran's former ambassador to Bahrain, Mohammad Farazmand said that Iranian-Arab relations are their worst since the Iranian revolution in 1978/9 (Iranian Diplomacy.ir, 11 April 2011).

The tension neared explosion in the aftermath of the GCC's Peninsula Shield Forces crossing the King Fahd causeway linking Saudi Arabia and Bahrain on 14 March to support the Al Khalifa regime. Referring to the GCC forces in Bahrain, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared, "This military invasion was a foul and doomed experience," and, alluding to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, said, "Certain people have deployed military forces…Why do they deploy forces against a neighboring country to confront the people? The fate of Saddam is before everyone. Why do certain people insist on repeating the failed experiences of Saddam in the region?"(Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1—BBC World Monitoring, 16 March 2011) 

The popular uprising in Bahrain, which began with a "day of rage" on 14 February, was organized by Bahrain's youth and inspired by the mass movements in Tunisia and Egypt. The protesters were not calling for an end to the Sunni Al Khalifa kingship, instead their major aim was to turn the kingdom into a constitutional monarchy, similar to those in Europe.  The popular grievances stem from what is perceived to be institutional and widespread discrimination against the Shi'i majority (estimated to be 65-70% of the population) by the ruling Sunni minority. 

The main opposition parties in Bahrain have stated they have no desire for Iranian style "vilayet-e faqih"(guardianship of the jurist) government; indeed the protesters main goal appears to be return to the 1973 constitution which granted greater powers to the elected legislature.  Further, the Shi'i majority in Bahrain wants to see an end to gerrymandering which artificially limits Shi'i representation and guarantees Sunni supremacy.  In addition, there is a widespread belief that the ruling Al Khalifa family appears to be fighting the demographic battle against the Shi'i majority by granting citizenship to foreign born Sunnis who serve in the Bahraini security forces.  The government's response to the protesters has flip-flopped between appeasement and force, which some say indicates the division in the ruling Al Khalifa family between the reform minded King Hamad (who assumed power in 1999) and his uncle, the conservative Prime Minister, Prince Khalifa, who has served in that position since 1971.

Despite the protesters' attempts to present their claims within the framework of the existing Bahraini political system, the popular unrest appears to have raised deep-seated fears among the Al Khalifa and the neighboring Sunni ruling families that Iran is meddling in their internal affairs and undermining their regimes. Therefore, the GCC's public statements have placed the blame on Iran for the popular unrest in Bahrain.  Even Qatar, which in recent years has sought to play a mediating role between Iran and the Arab rulers in the Gulf, has quietly distanced itself from the Islamic Republic of Iran following the recent crisis in Bahrain.

Iranians believe that Bahrain was part of the ancient Iranian empires dating as far back as the sixth century B.C.E.  Iran also exercised control over Bahrain during the Safavid Empire (1501-1722). Iran's historical claim to sovereignty over Bahrain, was understood to be laid to rest when Iran formally accepted the 1970 UN administered opinion poll which determined that Bahrainis wanted to remain an independent Arab state. Yet Iran's claim has been periodically revived by the Islamic Republic of Iran; in 2007, Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor of the influential Iranian daily newspaper Keyhan, claimed that Bahrain was an Iranian province and that Bahrainis favored reunification with Iran (see Iran Pulse 14).

The Sunni Arab rulers in the Gulf genuinely fear the threat of Iranian hegemony and interference in the Gulf, yet at the same time they would like to use the potential threat posed by the Islamic Republic as a scapegoat in order to sidestep the difficult domestic challenges of representative government and sectarian discrimination.  For Iran, Bahrain has been, and continues to be, a symbolic issue more than a strategic priority.  Historically, Iran has used its rhetoric toward Bahrain as a means to assert what it perceives to be its natural leadership position in the Gulf. 

Bahrain has little wealth or comparative geo-strategic value to Iran.  In contrast to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen, where the Islamic Republic has spent considerable material resources building its influence in recent years, there is little open-source evidence to suggest that Iran has devoted similar resources to the opposition in Bahrain. However, it is difficult to say for certain that Iran has not attempted to extend its influence in Bahrain during the current unrest, whether it is through Hizbullah or other networks that may have a presence in Bahrain.

It is possible that Iran believes that it doesn't need to expend resources on Bahrain, because the Bahrain's large Shi'i community is tied to Iran by fundamental bonds of shared faith and ideology.  For example, Shaykh Isa Qasim, perhaps the leading Shi'i religious figure in Bahrain, spent eight years of his political exile from Bahrain studying in the Shi'i religious center of Qom in Iran during the 1990s.  Nevertheless, even Shaykh Qasim reportedly looks to Ayatollah 'Ali Sistani of Iraq for guidance, and not to Iran's Supreme Leader, 'Ali Khamene'i.  

What then, is the Islamic Republic hoping to gain from the political upheaval in Bahrain?  It seems to have two related aims in exploiting the crisis in Bahrain for its own gain.  First, Iran has been claiming the recent GCC intervention in Bahrain as being orchestrated by the US.  This serves  two  goals.  It  attempts to

de-legitimize the Arab Gulf rulers with their own peoples, and it attempts to portray the US as an imperial power that supports oppressive regimes.  This, in turn, is supposed to elevate Iran's regional stature and influence at the expense of the US and the Arab Gulf rulers.  Iran would stand to gain an important victory in the Gulf if the US decided to withdraw its fifth fleet and 4,000 servicemen from Bahrain, even if they were relocated to another US base in the Gulf.  

Second, Iran has attempted to frame the unrest in Bahrain not a Sunni-Shi'i conflict, but, borrowing terminology from Ayatollah Khomeini, a revolution of the Muslim "oppressed" (mostaz'afin) against their oppressors (See 'Ali Khamene'i's Noruz speech 21 March 2011).  The Islamic Republic of Iran may believe that the wave of popular revolts across the region is part of a part of a longer revolutionary process initiated in Iran in 1978/9.  Indeed, rather than actively exporting its revolution, it seems that the regime in Iran is hoping that Bahrain is part of the long-awaited chain reaction that would promote Iran's Islamic Revolution by example or persuasion. However, it is clear from the GCC actions, that the Sunni ruling families in the Gulf will not sit back and passively allow Iran to fan the flames of revolution among the Shi'is in their backyards.  The line in the sand has been drawn■

T h e    A l l i a n c e    C e n t e r    f o r    I r a n i a n    S t u d i e s  ( A C I S )

Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv 61390, Tel Aviv P.O.B. 39040, Israel

Email: IranCen@post.tau.ac.il  Phone: +972-3-640-9510

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Iran Pulse No. 45 ● May 20, 2011

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